Onel J. Barnett and Evelyn I. Barnett v. State Automobile & Causalty Underwriters and Diversified Insurance Agency, and A-1 Agencies Diversified : Brief of Appellant State Automobile & Casualty Underwriters by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1971
Onel J. Barnett and Evelyn I. Barnett v. State
Automobile & Causalty Underwriters and
Diversified Insurance Agency, and A-1 Agencies
Diversified : Brief of Appellant State Automobile &
Casualty Underwriters
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errorsRaymond M. Berry; Attorney for AppellantJohn L. Black;
Attorney for Respondents
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Barnett v. State Automobile, No. 12264 (Utah Supreme Court, 1971).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/239
J '<- ,.~ -
IN THE SUPREME .c().~.~ 
OF THE STATE OF'. 
·, 
ONEL J. BARNETI' and EVELYN ,;/;.;; :o; 
I. BARNETI', . ""'<'f. 
P~ffs MU}, Res~t 
v. 
STATE AUTOMOBILE &: 
CASUALTY UNDERWBJ~-.' 
, \ ··"""" 
Defentldm Ml4 . 
and 
DIVERSIFIED INSUB.ANCI ·. r ': ;_ 
AGENCY, and A-1 AG~: 
DIVERSIFIED, 
JOHN L. BLACK , :~ . 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Ud 
Attomey for kl•• ?fii(." 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
.. 
I 
"' 
I 
r" 
INDEX 
Page 
NA TIJRE OF THE CASE ------------------------------------------------------------ 1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT ---------------------------------------- 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL -------------------------------------------------- 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ------------------------------------------------------------ 2 
ARGUMENT ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7 
POINT I 
THERE CAN BE NO RECOVERY UNDER THE 
STATE AUTO HOMEOWNER'S POLICY BE-
CAUSE THE POLICY COVERAGE HAD EXPIR-
ED BEFORE THE LOSS OCCURRED ------------------------ 7 
POINT II 
STATE AUTO HAD NO DUTY TO NOTIFY 
THE PLAINTIFFS OF THE EXPIRATION DA TE 
OR TO RENEW THE POLICY ------------------------------------ 10 
POINT III 
THE TESTIMONY OF MR. BARNETT AND 
WILLIAM SLAUGH ON "CUSTOM OR USAGE" 
WAS IMPROPER ------------------------------------------------------------ 14 
POINT IV 
BECAUSE ALL PRIOR CONVERSATIONS AND 
AGREEMENTS ARE MERGED INTO THE 
WRITTEN INSTRUMENT ONCE EXECUTED, 
IT WAS ERROR TO ALLOW P AROL EVI-
DENCE IN CONFLICT WITH THE INSURANCE 
POLICY ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 21 
CONCLUSION -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 27 
CASES OTED 
Brooks v. Renner & Co., 243 Ark 226, 419 S.W.2d 
305 ( 1967) --- -- -- --- --- -- -- ----- --- ---- -- --- ------- -------------------------- ------ ____ .20, 21 
Cortina v. General Insurance Co. of America, 40 Misc. 2d 
I 916, 244 N.Y.S.2d 243 (1963) ------------------------------------------------ 19 
;... 
' ' 
I 
~ 
Field v. Missouri State Line Insurance Co., 77 Utah 45, 
290 P. 979 (1930) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 26 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX (Conrinued) 
Page 
Idaho Forwarding Co. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 8 
Utah 41, 29 P. 826 (1892) ----------------------------------------------------25, 26 
Jones v. New York Life Insurance Co., 69 Utah 172, 
253 P. 200 (1926) ----------------------------------------------------------------23, 24 
Kapahua v. Hawaiian Insurance and Guaranty Co., 447 
P.2d 669 (Hawaii 1968) -------------------------------------------------------- 11 
Kimball v. Ointon County New Patrons Fire Relief Assn., 
23 A.D.2d 519, 255 N.Y.S.2d 366 (1965) ---------------------------- 13 
Marriot v. Pacific National Life Assurance Co., 24 Utah 
2d 182, 467 P.2d 981, 983 (1970) ---------------------------------------- 9 
M.F.A. Mutual Insurance Co. v. Black, 441 S.W.2d 134 
(Ky. 1969) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------18, 19 
Munro v. Boston Insurance Co., 370 Mich. 604, 122 N.W.2d 
654 ( 1963) ----------------- --------- ---- -------- ________________________________________ 12, 13 
Okamura v. Time Insurance Co., 24 Utah 2d 209, 468 P.2d 
958 ( 1970) --- --- ---------------------------------------- ----- ___________________________ 17' 18 
Siewerdsen v. U.S.F.&G., 184 Neb. 870, 173 N.W.2d 27 
(1969) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------19, 20 
United Pacific Insurance Co. v. Northwestern National In-
surance Co., 185 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1950) -------------------------- 24 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Ann. §31-19-11 (1953) ------------------------------------------------ 8 
Utah Code Ann. §31-19-18 (1953) ------------------------------------------------ 23 
Utah Code Ann. §31-19-26 (1953) ------------------------------------------------ 23 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
12 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, 247 §7175 (1943)____ 9 
1 Couch on Insurance 2d 757 §15:61 (1959) -------------------------------- 14 
1 Couch on Insurance 2d 759 §15:63 (1959) -------------------------------- 15 
5 Couch on Insurance 2d 662 §30: 128 (1960) ------------------------------ 16 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE O,F UTAH 
ONEL J. BARNETT and EVELYN 
I. BARNETT, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. 
STATE AUTOMOBILE & 
CASUALTY UNDERWRITERS, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
and 
DIVERSIFIED INSURANCE 
AGENCY, and A-1 AGENCIES 
DIVERSIFIED, Defendants. 
Case No. 
12264 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT STATE AUTOMOBILE & 
CASUALTY UNDERWRITERS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action on a fire insurance contract. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Judgment on separate jury verdicts were made and 
entered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defend-
ants, Diversified Insurance Agency and State Automobile 
& Casualty Underwriters in the amount of $23,484.07. 
1 
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The lower court granted a judgment of dismissal in favor 
of the defendant A-1 Agencies Diversified dismissing the 
plaintiffs' claims against them. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
This defendant seeks reversal of the judgment of the 
lower court against it and an order directing the lower 
court to grant judgment in its favor as a matter of law 
or in the alternative to grant this defendant a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
State Automobile & Casualty Underwriters (herein-
after called State Auto) is an insurance company author-
ized to write fire insurance in the State of Utah. Guar-
antee Security Insurance Company is an insurance com-
pany of which State Auto had assumed all obligations. 
Plaintiffs, the Barnetts, are residents of Vernal, Utah. 
On October 19, 1967, the Barnetts' home and fur-
nishings were damaged by fire. A Guaranty Security In-
surance homeowners policy (No. HO 112-63035) includ-
ing fire coverage on the Barnett home had expired Octo-
ber 1, 1967, eighteen days prior to the fire. 
Because State Auto later assumed the liabilities un-
der this policy, the policy will hereinafter be ref erred to 
as the State Auto policy. 
2 
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Mr. Barnett admitted at trial that he had not read 
the policy or made note of the expiration date prior to 
locking the policy in a Vernal bank safety deposit box 
(R.179, 191) and had not requested that he be notified 
prior to the expiration date (R. 199). 
Five or six days after the fire Mrs. Barnett back-
dated a check to October 1, 1967, in an attempt to create 
after-the-fact coverage and mailed it to Diversified In-
surance Agency, through whom the State Auto policy had 
originally been written. The check was returned (R.196, 
217) (Exhibit 26-DA-1). 
No proof of loss was ever filed with State Auto 
(R.198). 
For about twenty-two years prior to October 1, 1964, 
Nob le Kimball, a local insurance agent, handled the fire 
insurance needs of the Barnetts (R.187). Noble Kimball 
enjoyed the full confidence of the Barnetts in their insur-
ance needs and always selected the insurer without any 
preference designation by the Barnetts (R.188). 
Noble Kimball over the years had placed the Bar-
netts insurance with several companies (R.187). From 
July 5, 1961, to July 5, 1964, they were insured with the 
Pearl Assurance Company under policy F 10 78 45 75 
(Exhibit 2-P) (R.171). 
A few days before the State Auto policy became ef-
fective on October 1, 1964, Mr. Barnett was introduced 
to Richard Salisbury, president and manager of Diversi-
3 
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fied Insurance Agency, who had been brought into his 
office by Noble Kimball (R.174). Mr. Kimball explained 
that he was retiring from business and that Diversified 
Insurance Agency was going to handle his accounts from 
that time on. Richard Salisbury told Mr. Barnett that 
he would do his best to continue the services Noble Kim-
ball had previously given and Mr. Barnett accepted Rich-
ard Salisbury as his new agent (R.176). 
Diversified Insurance Agency issued the State Auto 
homeowner's policy effective October 1, 1964 including 
fire coverage, personal liability coverage, and medical 
payments coverage. This was a broader coverage than 
in the Pearl Assurance policy furnished by Noble Kim-
ball which had expired on July 5, 1964, nearly three 
months before (R.178). 
Apparently Noble Kimball had let the Barnetts' fire 
insurance lapse for the period between July 5, 1964 when 
Pearl Assurance policy expired and October 1, 1964 when 
the State Auto policy became effective. No evidence of 
coverage during this three month period was presented 
at trial. 
Despite this evidence of a three month lapse in cov-
erage Mr. Barnett was allowed, over objections, to testify 
that it was the custom and practice of Mr. Kimball to 
renew their fire insurance and bill the Barnetts (R.169-70, 
190). It was undisputed that Noble Kimball was never 
an insurance agent or representative of Guarantee Secur-
ity or State Auto, the issuers of the policy upon which 
this case is based. 
4 
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Plaintiffs called only one other witness besides the 
Barnetts - William H. Slaugh, an agent serving a single 
company - State Farm Insurance. State Farm Insurance 
does not operate through the American Agency System 
which means it remains the owner of all renewal business 
as opposed to the local agent having all renewal rights 
(R.235-36). Mr. Slaugh, over objections, was permitted 
to testify about State Farm's procedures of notice to in-
sureds of forthcoming renewal dates and cancellation 
upon expiration of the policy (R.219-22, 226-30). The 
court further permitted Mr. Slaugh to testify, over ob-
jections, as to the practice of other companies in sending 
notices of expiration or renewal. His testimony was based 
only upon his past observations of other company's poli-
cies (R.229-30). 
Mr. Slaugh admitted that he had never heard of Di-
versified Insurance Agency or seen a policy issued through 
it prior to his appearance as a witness (R.230). 
In October 1964, the effective date of the State Auto 
homeowner's policy, the Kolob Corporation served as a 
general agent for Guarantee Security Insurance (R.276). 
Later, Diversified Insurance Agency became Guaranty 
Security's general agent. On February 28, 1966, State 
Auto assumed the liabilities and obligations of Guarantee 
Security Insurance Company (Exhibit 1-P). 
On November 28, 1965 Guarantee Security cancelled 
the agency agreement with Diversified and appointed 
Trans-Western Insurance Agency as its new general agent 
(R.277). Thereafter, Diversified was without authority 
5 
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to accept or bind State Auto or Guarantee Security on 
new risks though authorized to service policies then in 
effect until their expiration dates. 
Mr. Elwood Johnson, manager of the regional State 
Auto office, testified that State Auto operated through 
the American Agency System in which the agents, not the 
company, owned the right of renewals, i.e., State Auto 
had no right to bypass the local agent in an effort to re-
new an about-to-expire policy (R.276). Accordingly, State 
Auto did not notify plaintiffs their policy would expire 
October 1, 1967. 
The Barnetts filed a Complaint, an Amended Com-
plaint, and a Second Amended Complaint (R.l, 41, 58). 
They allege that on October 19, 1967, their home and 
furnishings were damaged by fire (R.l, 41, 59) and that 
on said date State Auto's policy No. HO 112-63035 was 
in full force and effect (R.1, 41, 58). There is no allega-
tion in any of the pleadings that State Auto had a duty 
to notify plaintiffs of their expiration of their policy or 
warn them prior to expiration. Neither do the pleadings 
allege that Diversified was acting within the scope of 
its authority as an agent for State Auto when it omitted 
to notify the Plaintiff of the expiration of their policy, 
nor is there an allegation that State Auto was negligent, 
careless or breached its contract in failing to notify plain-
tiffs their policy would expire October 1, 1967. 
6 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE CAN BE NO RECOVERY UNDER THE 
STATE AUTO HOMEOWNER'S POLICY BECAUSE 
THE POLICY COVERAGE HAD EXPIRED BEFORE 
THE LOSS OCCURRED. 
Plaintiffs filed an original Complaint, an Amended 
Complaint, and a Second Amended Complaint. The Sec-
ond Amended Complaint alleges three causes of action: 
one against State Auto, one against Diversified Insurance 
Agency, and one against A-1 Agencies Diversified. 
The cause of action alleged against State Auto m 
each complaint is an action in contract. With respect to 
the State Auto policy each complaint contains the sen-
tence: 
"That said insurance policy was in full force and 
effect on October 19, 1967." (R.1, 41, 58) 
October 19, 1967 is the date of the fire which dam-
aged the Barnett home. 
Plaintiffs' contract theory of recovery under the pol-
icy was presented to the jury in Instruction No. 12 which 
stated: 
* * * 
"The First Cause of Action in plaintiff's com-
plaint is directed against only the defendant, State 
Automobile and Casualty Underwriters, and with 
respect to that defendant plaintiffs allege that said 
company issued a fire insurance policy upon their 
home in Vernal, Utah, and its contents and fur-
7 
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ther allege that said policy was in full force and 
effect on October 19, 1967, and that pursuant to 
the terms of the policy said defendant is liable to 
plaintiffs for the loss sustained by them as a con-
sequence of such fire." (R.91) (Emphasis added.) 
* * * 
The jury therefore was instructed that any recovery 
against State auto must be "pursuant to the terms of the 
policy." 
Utah Code Ann. § 31-19-11 (1953) requires that the 
policy term be specified in an insurance contract: 
"31-19-11. What constitutes policy - Re-
quired specifications in policy. -( 1) The written 
instrument, in which a contract of insurance is set 
forth, is the policy. 
(2) A policy shall specify: 
* * * 
(e) the time at which the insurance there-
under takes effect and the period during which 
the insurance is to continue; * * *" 
On the front of the State Auto policy directly under 
the name and address of the Barnetts is stated the cover-
age term of the policy. The term is from October 1, 1964 
to October 1, 1967. 
Item nine (9) under the "General Conditions" por-
tion of the policy contains the words "Policy Term" in 
bold face type followed by: 
8 
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"This policy applies only to losses or occur-
rences during the policy term." (Exhibit 1-P) 
Under no construction of the policy can any loss 
occurring after October 1, 1967 be deemed covered "pur-
suant to the terms of the policy." 
12 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, 247 § 
7175 (1943) states: 
"Fire policies expire according to their terms. 
Courts cannot disregard a plain, unambiguous 
statement in the policy as to the expiration date, 
in the absence of accident, mistake, or fraud." 
There is no ambiguity about the expiration date of 
the policy - it is conspicuous on the front of the policy. 
Plaintiffs have not alleged the October 1, 1967 expiration 
date was placed on the policy through accident, mistake 
or fraud. To require payment under the policy for a loss 
occurring after coverage had expired is to ignore the 
clear and unambiguous language of this contract and re-
quire the payment of a loss for which no premium had 
been charged or paid. 
Such a result is contrary to the law and specifically 
to Marriot v. Pacific National Life Assurance Co., 24 
Utah 2d 182, 467 P.2d 981, 983 (1970) where this court 
stated: 
"[I]nasmuch as insurance coverage is based 
on contract, unless there is some good reason to 
the contrary, we are obliged to assume that lan-
guage included therein was put there for a pur-
pose, and to give it effect where its meaning is 
clear and unambiguous.'' 
9 
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The premium paid by Mr. Barnett was for the three 
year period from October 1, 1964 to October 1, 1967. 
He received the coverage during that period in return 
for his premium. 
Any coverage the Barnetts had after October 1, 1967 
could not have been provided under this policy. If the 
coverage was provided beyond October 1, 1967 under 
any other contract there could still be no liability to State 
Auto because plaintiffs cause of action was based on the 
policy which expired October 1, 1967. 
It was error to submit State Auto's liability under 
the policy to the jury. In finding State Auto liable the 
jury ignored their instructions that State Auto's liability 
must be found from the policy. State Auto should be 
held not liable under the policy as a matter of law. 
POINT II 
STA TE AUTO HAD NO DUTY TO NOTIFY THE 
PLAINTIFFS OF THE EXPIRATION DA TE OR TO 
RENEW THE POLICY. 
The Barnett home fire occurred nineteen days after 
the policy expired. There is no provision in the policy 
requiring State Auto to renew the policy or notify the in-
sureds of expiration. The policy was not written for a 
continuous period and State Auto had never insured the 
Barnett home previously. If suit were brought by an in-
surer to collect a renewal premium due after expiration 
of a policy and the insured had already given his bus-
iness to another insurer, it is certain that the insured 
10 
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would be outraged and for sure no court in the land 
would allow a recovery of the renewal premium by the 
insurance company from the former insured. 
The duty to notify of cancellation or renew has been 
argued to courts in many different jurisdictions. 
The cases consistently hold that under conditions as 
presented by this case there is no duty to notify or renew 
absent a specific provision to that effect in the policy. 
Kapahua v. Hawaiian Insurance and Guaranty Co., 
447 P.2d 669 (Hawaii 1968), involved the issue of duty 
to renew. Kapahua purchased automobile insurance from 
the defendant through an agent by the name of Moss-
man for a term stated from May 9, 1966 to May 9, 1967. 
The contract contained no grace period provision nor any 
provision that a notice of expiration would be sent. 
Plaintiff sued the insurer for damages incurred in an 
accident seventeen days after the policy expired. Plain-
tiffs' theory was that the defendants were negligent in 
their alleged duty, derived from an implied contractual 
duty determined by custom in the insurance industry, to 
notify her of the expiration of the policy or to renew the 
policy automatically. The trial court directed a verdict 
for the defendants. In affirming the judgment the Hawaii 
Supreme Court stated: 
"It may well be in the public interest that 
automobile insurance policies should not lapse due 
to forgetfulness on the part of the insured, or in-
consistent action of insurers and that a duty be 
imposed upon the insurers to give notice of expi-
ration before terminating the current policies. 
11 
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But, unless expressly written in the insurance con-
tract, such duty may only be imposed by the legis-
lature." Id. at 671. 
The court pointed out that the rule urged by plain-
tiff would violate the statute requiring insurance agree-
ments to be in writing since it would impose a duty upon 
the insured to pay premiums to the company beyond the 
expiration date of the policy. 
Munro v. Boston Insurance Co., 370 Mich. 604, 122 
N.W.2d 654 (1963), involved the same issue. The Munro 
case was an action on a fire insurance policy in which 
the policy expired August 29, 1960. The policy was 
written by a local agency which subsequently was sold 
to Holly Insurance Agency. Holly Insurance Agency did 
not notify the insured either before or after August 29, 
1960, that the policy would or had expired. The dwell-
ing described in the policy was destroyed by fire on Jan-
uary 23, 1961. After the fire the plaintiffs were advised 
no payment would be made because the policy had ex-
pired. Suit was instituted on the basis of an alleged cus-
tom observed by the companies in the area of giving 
notice prior to expiration of fire insurance policies. 
In affirming a directed verdict for the insurer the 
Michigan Supreme Court stated: 
"The provisions of the policy before us were 
duly observed. The installments of the premium 
were presumably paid as they fell due. The policy 
was not one for a continuing period based on 
compliance with its terms but, rather, specified 
clearly and unequivocally the date of expiration. 
12 
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Plaintiffs were bound by that provision. No obli-
gation rested on defendant to seek the execution 
of another contract, and liability was not extended 
under the expired undertaking on the theory ad-
vanced by appellants. (Emphasis added.) 
* * * 
"The acceptance of appellant's claim would 
result, in effect, in creation of liability following 
the expiration of the policy as written, and would 
from a practical standpoint be the equivalent of 
creating a new contract between the parties." 
Kimball v. Clinton County New Patrons Fire Relief 
Assn., 23 A.D.2d 519, 255 N.Y.S.2d 366 (1965), is also 
factually similar to the matter before this court. Kimball 
brought suit against a fire insurer for damages arising 
from the destruction of a building after the expiration 
date of the policy. The policy contained no provision 
requiring the insurance company to give notice of an 
expiration date. Kimball relied on a custom of the in-
surer and the insured's agent to discuss renewal coverage 
or new and different coverage prior to expiration which 
was not done prior to the last expiration. The court af-
firmed judgment for the insurance company stating: 
"The policy was not cancelled during its term. 
It contained no provision requiring notice of its 
expiration other than the expiration date appear-
ing therein; nor, of course, was there a require-
ment of notice of any assessment not applicable 
during this term. 
"The terms of the policy were always within 
the knowledge of the plaintiff, and if he failed to 
remember the policy expired at a certain time 
before the fire, it was his own negligence, and 
13 
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not the defendant's which prevented the plain-
tiff from renewing the policy." 255 N.Y.S.2d at 
367. 
POINT III 
THE TESTIMONY OF MR. BARNETT AND WIL-
LIAM SLAUGH ON "CUSTOM OR USAGE" WAS 
IMPROPER. 
Throughout the trial plaintiffs presented evidence, 
over repeated objections, to show alteration of the policy 
through "custom and usage." 
Though the policy was clear as to its term, plaintiffs 
argued that custom required State Auto to continue cov-
erage beyond the expiration date stated in the policy. 
1 Couch on Insurance 2d 757 § 15:61 (1959) states: 
"Usage or custom at variance with terms of 
contract. If the contract is stated in clear, posi-
tive, and unambiguous terms, usage or custom 
cannot be permitted to vary or contradict the terms 
used." (Emphasis added.) 
Allowing evidence before the jury which directly 
conflicted wtih the clear terms of the State Auto policy 
was therefore error. 
Even where the evidence of usage or custom is pre-
sented to show some act not at variance with the con-
tract there are certain characteristics which it must possess 
before it can be admitted into evidence: 
14 
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"Essentials of usage constituting aid in con-
struction. In order that a usage may be ad-
mitted in evidence as an aid to the construction 
of an insurance policy, it must possess certain 
characteristics, namely, it must be generally well 
established and notorious, uniform, and reason-
able. It must be general, that is, general to the 
whole mercantile world, or in regard to the par-
ticular trade to which it has reference." 1 Couch 
on Insurance 2d 759 § 15:63 (1959). (Emphasis 
added.) 
State Auto, as many insurers in the industry, oper-
ates through what is called the "American Agency Sys-
tem." This system recognizes that many customers have 
been secured solely through the efforts of agents who 
represent several insurers. As such, the customer is deemed 
to be the agent's asset as opposed to the insurer's. There-
fore only the agent has the right to directly contact the 
customer in securing renewal of a policy. Automatic re-
newal or efforts to secure a renewal by the insurer di-
rectly with the customer would violate the regulations 
of the American Agency System. The customer has the 
advantage under this system of not being "locked in" 
to one company and therefore being able to place his 
insurance with the most favorable insurer among the 
several his agent represents. 
At trial, Mr. Elwood Johnson, manager of the reg-
ional State Auto office, explained how the American 
Agency System operated. He testified that State Auto 
operated through the American Agency System (R.276). 
15 
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Other insurers, not members of the American Agency 
System, own the renewal rights of their policies and there-
fore contact the customer directly in seeking a renewal. 
The custom of giving notice of expiration and can-
cellation, therefore, is not general to the whole insurance 
trade. Obviously, then, the custom cannot be binding in 
its effect upon the insurers not participating in the custom: 
"It is to be noted that the custom or usage 
which gives rise to a duty to give notice is not 
custom or usage in the general sense in which 
those terms are employed in contract law but 
relates only to the practice of the particular in-
surer." 5 Couch on Insurance 2d 662 § 30: 128 
( 1960) (Emphasis added.) 
All of the evidence presented by plaintiffs in at-
tempting to show a custom binding upon State Auto was 
objected to as without foundation, immaterial, irrele-
vant, or based on hearsay. (R. 169-72, 175-76, 180-83, 
220-22, 227-33, 239-47). 
Mr. Barnett testified that his agent, Noble Kimball, 
had always renewed his fire insurance since 1942 with-
out fail (R.187). Plaintiffs were unable to explain, how-
ever, why Mr. Kimball had allowed a three month lapse 
between the effective date of the State Auto policy and 
the policy with Pearl Assurance held prior to the State 
Auto policy. 
Mr. Barnett admitted that the renewal or notice of 
expiration was always Mr. Kimball's act and not the 
insurers. The Barnetts' insurance had been placed in var-
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10us companies through the years (R.187). The State 
Auto policy on the Barnett home which expired prior to 
the fire was the only State Auto policy Mr. Barnett ever 
owned because Noble Kimball had never, in his entire 
career, represented State Auto. 
Plaintiffs also called William H. Slaugh to testify 
concerning insurers' renewal practices. Mr. Slaugh was 
allowed to testify as to the practices of other companies 
though he himself represented only one insurer. The 
company he represented did not operate through the 
American Agency System (R.235-36). His knowledge of 
other insurers' renewal practices was in fact not based 
upon custom at all but upon what was contained in the 
policies of these other companies (R.229-30) ! 
The evidence of renewal customs should never have 
been admitted because no foundation for the testimony 
was established which showed the custom to be that of 
State Auto as opposed to some other insurer. Noble Kim-
ball's treatment of the Barnett account over the years 
could not establish a custom binding upon State Auto -
a company he never represented. 
Despite the uncontested fact that the Barnetts had 
owned only a singly policy with State Auto and this single 
policy was written through an agent they had never seen 
but once (R. 194, 199, 200), the issue of custom contra-
dicting the policy's terms was allowed to go to the jury. 
In the recent case of Okamura v. Time Insurance Co., 
24 Utah 2d 209, 468 P.2d 958 (1970), this court rejected 
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the theory that acceptance of one prior premium after the 
due date was sufficient to establish a custom waiving 
prompt payment: 
"A custom or usage exists only when followed 
for a substantial period of time." 468 P.2d at 959. 
It is clear from similar cases that the insurance con-
tract cannot be modified by a custom which is binding 
only on the insurer - such a custom goes no further than 
achieving the status of "a business practice." 
In M.F.A. Mutual Insurance Co. v. Black, 441 S.W.2d 
134 (Ky. 1969), suit was brought on an auto insurance 
policy. The policy showed on its face that coverage ex-
pired January 25, 1965. The accident occurred January 
27, 1965, or two days after expiration. 
Black claimed coverage under the policy on the theory 
that since the insurance company had given him three 
free extra days on the original six months policy, it should 
have done the same thing on the new policy, which would 
have extended the coverage period to January 28. 
The appellate court reversed a jury verdict for Black 
and stating that the issue should never have been submit-
ted to the jury; the insurer was entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. 
The court also pointed out the inconsistency of plain-
tiff's argument in bringing this action under the insurance 
contract and at the same time denying the clear terms of 
the policy as to the expiration date: 
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"There is nothing in the record creating any 
additional obligation of appellant. A person can-
not claim both under and against the same instru-
ment. [Cites omitted] There was no issue to submit 
to the jury." 441 S.W.2d at 136. (Emphasis added.) 
Cortina v. General Insurance Co. of America, 40 Misc. 
2d 916, 244 N.Y.S.2d 243 (1963), was an action against 
an insurer ·and agent to declare coverage on an automo-
bile stolen several days after the insured's policy had ex-
pired. No notice was given by General Insurance Com-
pany or its agent that the policy to Cortina would not be 
renewed. Cortina had secured the policy on September 
10, 1955, effective for a period of one year. Hammond, 
an agent for General Insurance Company, had last renew-
ed the policy September 10, 1958, to expire September 10, 
1959. General Insurance Company cancelled the Ham-
mond Agency on September 1, 1959. Therefore, when the 
policy expired on September 10, 1959, Hammond had no 
authority to write any insurance for General. Cortina was 
not informed of the cancellation of the agency. The plain-
tiff contended the prior course of conduct led him to be-
lieve the policy would be automatically renewed. This 
contention was rejected by the New York Court which 
stated the policy clearly showed it was not effective on 
the date the automobile was stolen. 
Siewerdsen v. U.S.F.&G., 184 Neb. 870, 173 N.W.2d 
27 ( 1969), involves a set of facts analogous to this case 
and points out that a custom to renew a policy does not 
bind the insurer unless the custom is equally binding on 
the insured. In this case the plaintiff purchased an auto-
mobile liability policy on June 6, 1962 from an agency 
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through a soliciting agent. The policy delivered showed 
coverage from June 6, 1962 to June 6, 1963. The policy 
expired by its own terms. The soliciting agent who origi 
nally obtained the policy entered into an agency agreement 
with U.S.F.&G. The agency for U.S.F.&G. did not renew 
the policy because the soliciting agent had taken the busi-
ness. No renewal notice was sent to the insured or to 
the soliciting agent by U.S.F.&G. On May 7, 1963, 
U.S.F.&G. mailed a renewal policy to the original agency 
but this policy was returned for cancellation without no-
tice to the plaintiff. The appellant court, in reversing a 
judgment for the plaintiff, stated: 
"An insurance policy is a contract which re-
quires an offer and acceptance to be effective. 
[Cites omitted.] If there is no obligation as to one 
of the parties, there is none as to the other. 
* * * 
"But a custom to renew, even if established, 
does not bind the insurer unless it is also binding 
upon the insured. There must be a contract to re-
new as distinguished from a mere custom." 173 
N.W.2d at 28. 
Brooks v. Renner & Co., 243 Ark. 226, 419 S.W.2d 
305 (1967), arose from a loss after the policy expired. 
Brooks, the plaintiff, for ten years had insured one or more 
automobiles through the Renner Agency. A policy written 
annually carried a four month expiration date. Prior to 
the expiration date Renner, the agent, received a four 
month renewal statement from the insurer. Brooks, how-
ever, had moved from Fayetteville to Little Rock, about 
200 miles away, and Renner did not renew the policy. 
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The policy expired October 3, 1964. After an accident on 
November 2, 1965, Brooks sought coverage for the loss 
from the Renner Agency and the insurer. Summary judg-
ment was rendered for both defendants. 
In affirming the judgment the appellate court em-
phasized the expiration date was plain and unambiguous 
and explained that the agency's past offers of renewal were 
over and above the obligation created by the contracts and 
that there was no duty to renew. 
"We recognize that service agencies are ex-
pected to, and usually do take an interest in the 
welfare of their regular customers. Ofttimes they 
render courtesies over and above the obligations 
created by contracts. That is simply good business 
.... " 419 S.W.2d at 307. 
POINT IV 
BECAUSE ALL PRIOR CONVERSATIONS AND 
AGREEMENTS ARE MERGED INTO THE WRIT-
TEN INSTRUMENT ONCE EXECUTED, IT WAS 
ERROR TO ALLOW PAROL EVIDENCE IN CON-
FLICT WITH THE INSURANCE POLICY. 
On direct examination Mr. Barnett was asked: 
"Q Now would you tell me what the custom and 
practice was between you and Mr. Kimball as 
far as renewing your insurance when you ran 
out?" (R.169) 
This defendant then objected on the basis that no 
proper foundation had been laid for the testimony, that it 
would be hearsay as concerned what Mr. Kimball might 
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have allegedly said to him, and that the testimony was ir-
relevant and immaterial to the issue before the court. The 
objection was overruled and Mr. Barnett testified: 
"A ... He would always notify me either by mail 
or in person, mostly in person we transacted our 
business. 
* * * 
"A He would either notify me by mail or by state-
ment. I paid all my bills and my insurance by 
statement and notice, and by personal contact. 
"Q (By Mr. Black) Was there ever any time when 
Mr. Kimball himself paid the premium and you 
paid him back? 
MR. BERRY: Your Honor, I'm going to object, it's 
immaterial, irrelevant, and no foundation has 
been laid to show that Mr. Kimball was our 
agent. 
THE WITNESS: Yes he did (R. 170) 
Barnett's theory is that because Noble Kimball al-
ways notified him concerning renewal of his insurance, 
and Richard Salisbury had said he would take care of 
Mr. Barnett as Noble Kimball had done, that State Auto 
was liable on the policy even after it expired. 
Even if Mr. Barnett had specifically asked Richard 
Salisbury to renew the policy beyond the October 1, 1967 
date, and Salisbury had agreed to do so, the agreement 
would be invalid under Utah law. 
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Section 31-19-18 Utah Code Ann. (1953) provides: 
"31-19-18. Contract of insurance - Variations 
of terms of policy invalid. - No insurer or its 
agent, nor any solicitor or broker shall make any 
contract of insurance or agreement as to such con-
tract, other than is plainly expressed in the policy 
issued thereon. Any such understanding or agree-
ment not so expressed shall be invalid." 
Section 31-19-26 Utah Code Ann. (1953) provides: 
"31-19-26. Insurance contracts - Modifica-
tion of. - No modification of any insurance con-
tract shall be effective unless in writing executed by 
the insurer and if it contains conditions limiting or 
reducing benefits or protection otherwise applic-
able such writing shall also be executed by the 
insured." 
The policy clearly states that it expires on October 
1, 1967. This provision of the policy could not be waived 
without a written endorsement attached to the policy: 
"Waiver provisions. No permission affecting this 
insurance shall exist, or waiver of any provision 
be valid, unless granted herein or expressed in 
writing added hereto. No provision, stipulation 
or forfeiture shall be held to be waived by any 
requirement or proceeding on the part of this com-
pany relating to appraisal or to any examination 
provided for herein." (Exhibit 1-P) 
Under the law as set forth in Jones v. New York Life 
Insurance Co., 69 Utah 172, 253 P.200 (1926), Mr. Bar-
nett is charged with knowledge of the policy terms and 
bound by them: 
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"There is nothing to show that the insured 
was induced by any false or erroneous statements 
as to the meaning of those provisions and it must 
there/ ore be presumed that the insured knew the 
contents of the application and bound himself by 
the terms therein provided. In other words, the 
insured was charged with knowledge that no one 
save the officers enumerated in the application 
could waive any the company's rights or require-
ments and that notice to the soliciting agent was 
not notice to the company and that the agent was 
not authorized to accept risks or to pass upon in-
surability." 253 P. at 202, (Emphasis added.) 
In United Pacific Insurance Co. v. Northwestern 
National Insurance Co., 185 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1950), 
an insured contended that his business insurance policy 
provided broader coverage than was clearly shown by the 
policy terms. 
In reversing a judgment by Judge Willis W. Ritter 
for the insured, the Court of Appeals stated: 
"Neither can Ogden escape the effects of these 
provisions by not having read the policy when it 
was delivered to him and thus failing to discover 
that it did not contain the broad coverage for which 
he now contends. It was his duty to read the policy 
when it was delivered to him and he is charged 
with knowledge of its provisions, nothwithstand-
ing his failure to do so." Id. at 447 (Emphasis 
added.) 
It has long been the law of Utah that an insurer can-
not be held liable on an expired policy for a loss occurring 
after the expiration date. 
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An early Utah case is strikingly similar to the present 
case, Idaho Forwarding Co. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance 
Co., 8 Utah 41, 29 P. 826 (1892), involved an action 
against an insurance company on an alleged contract of 
insurance. On February 1, 1889, in consideration of 
$46.20 paid as premium, the stock of goods of Idaho For-
warding Company at Hailey, Idaho, were insured for one 
year by Fireman's Fund Insurance Company from Feb-
ruary 13, 1889 to February 13, 1890. On July 2, 1890 
the goods were destroyed by fire. 
Mallory, the agent of both parties, had previously 
told Albert Kiesel, plaintiff's manager, that $5,000 of the 
company's coverage was about to expire. Kiesel instructed 
Mallory to renew the coverage and Mallory responded 
that he would renew the $2,000 policy with Fireman's 
Fund and the remainder with two other companies. 
Mallory thought he had renewed the coverage, but 
after the fire it was discovered that the premium had not 
been paid. Idaho Forwarding Company attempted to pay 
the premium six days after the fire. 
At trial Kiesel was asked how long the renewed 
coverage was to be for. An objection to the question was 
overruled. The trial court found for Idaho Forwarding 
Company. 
On appeal the Utah Supreme Court reversed. Point-
ing out that plaintiff's theory as in the matter now before 
the court was "upon a contract in praesenti, not a contract 
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to thereafter insure," the court held it was improper to 
have allowed Kiesel to testify to the terms of the written 
contract: 
"It was improper to call for the conclusion of 
the witness as to the term of the insurance, or as 
to the premium to be paid. Those facts should 
have been found from the language used by the 
contractors." 29 P. at 827. 
The court also held that Fireman's Fund could not be 
liable under an expired policy for Mallory's failure to 
renew the policy: 
"For the failure to follow plaintiff's orders 
the defendant [insurer] cannot be held responsi-
ble." 29 P. at 826. 
In a later case involving an alleged life insurance 
contract, Field v. Missouri State Line Insurance Co., 77 
Utah 45, 290 P. 979 (1930), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
"It is an elementary rule of law that, where 
parties have reduced an agreement to writing and 
such written agreement is not vitiated by fraud or 
mutual mistake of fact, all prior conversations and 
parol agreements are so merged therein that they 
cannot be given in evidence for the purpose of 
changing the written contract or any part thereof 
nor showing any intention or understanding dif-
ferent from that expressed in the written agree-
ment." 
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The court also held that the doctrines of waiver and 
estoppel cannot be relied upon to avoid the rule of law 
that all prior conversations and agreements between the 
parties prior to execution of the written instrument are 
merged into the written agreement. Id. at 983. 
The testimony of Mr. Barnett and William Slaugh 
was presented in contradiction of the policy terms. It ob-
viously was prejudicial to State Auto because it allowed 
the jury to ignore the State Auto policy and render aver-
dict based on emotion and not on law. 
CONCLUSION 
The action against State Auto was one in contract. 
It was undisputed that the plaintiffs' home burned after 
the State Auto policy expired. Judgment for State Auto 
should have been given as a matter of law. This court 
should so hold. 
The testimony of Mr. Barnett and William Slaugh on 
insurers renewal and notice of expiration practices was 
improper because it created the impression that State Auto 
was bound to renew the Barnett policy because of a custom 
State Auto had never participated in vis-a-vis the Barnetts. 
The result before the trial court in this case destroys 
the laws of written contracts from the requirement of con-
sideration to the principle of expectancy. Plaintiffs, under 
their theory, enjoy the luxury of the benefits of insurance 
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which can never expire while being free at any time to 
drop at any moment the insurer they claim is bound and 
take their business elsewhere. 
Judgment for State Auto should be given as a matter 
of law. At the least a new trial should be ordered. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Raymond M. Berry of 
WORSLEY, SNOW & 
CHRISTENSEN 
Seventh Floor Continental Bank 
Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellant State 
Automobile & Casualty 
Underwriters 
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